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В России дата главного советского государственного праздника  7 
ноября под влиянием постперестроечной политики памяти подверглась 
переинтерпретации, превратившись в празднование очередной годовщины 
московского парада 1941 года. В целях размывания исторической памяти о 
революционном содержании даты 7 ноября  был  учрежден новый праздник, 
близкий по хронологии - 4 ноября, который в народе  не получил 
однозначной интерпретации.  
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Organised warfare has been waged by man for many centuries, some certain 
factors/elements of this pursuit have remained actual in spite of the advancement 
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of technology and the scale of destruction that is wrecked upon societies that are 
affected. There are two sides to war, the tangible and the intangible. The tangible 
elements are those physical components that can be seen, touched, felt and heard – 
soldiers, weapons, the terrain and weather for example. Those intangible elements 
may not be seen or heard, but they exert an impact upon the outcome of a war. 
Among the intangible, one can list politics, information, reputation, morale and 
perception.  
 When the public reads about war in newspapers or on the internet, 
hears it on the radio or watches it on TV, there is an overwhelming tendency by 
journalism and mass media to be very descriptive about the conflict that they are 
covering. It touches the surface, you see and hear the sights, sounds and horrors or 
war. Yet, the public may actually fail to understand how and why a war occurs in 
the first instance as it is void of analytical context. Given the rise in the usage of 
humanitarianism as an excuse to justify military action, there is a critical need to 
understand the intangible factors that influence the political environment and 
leading to, and the manner in which wars are fought.  
 This paper shall examine a number of different intangible factors that 
shape why and how wars are currently fought. A historical understanding and 
conceptualisation of wars shall be established through a brief introduction to a 
limited number of key historical treatises on the subject, namely Sun Tzu and Art 
of War, Niccolo Machiavelli and The Art of War, and Carl von Clausewitz’s On 
War. How do these influential volumes rate in terms of their relevance to today’s 
contemporary world? As shall be shown, in some instances, and relating to 
intangible elements they are still very relevant and generate some further 
understanding. 
 In the age of New Communication Technology and instantaneous 
global communication, information can be viewed by various actors simultaneous 
as being a threat and an opportunity. A threat owing to the potential to damage the 
intangible assets of an actor, especially those political factors related to legitimacy 
and credibility. But it is also an opportunity for the same reasons, it can be wielded 
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against an opponent’s intangible assets in order to weaken and/or isolate them. The 
last section deals with the actual targeting of the tangible and intangible assets. 
This shows the potential that can be harnessed through waging war not only in the 
traditional spheres of land, sea and air, but also into the information space.  
 
Historical Framing of the Elements and Pursuit of War 
 
From a historical point of view, there has been an age old interest in the 
philosophical and theoretical aspects and components of war. The study and 
development of these points tends to be aimed at bettering the prosecution of war 
by turning it into an object of study or a form of art. This has been carried out 
through the ages, since organised forms of warfare have been waged by man. This 
section shall look briefly at three influential authors, Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz 
and Niccolo Machiavelli, with regard to their views on the role of the politics and 
intangible elements in influencing warfare.  
 Sun Tzu was an influential Chinese general and tactician, born in the 
6th Century BC in China, he has greatly influenced East Asia, and continues to 
influence Western thought on the topic of war. According to Sun Tzu “warfare is 
the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Tao to survival or 
extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analysed” (Sun Tzu, 2003: 10). He 
broke down the structure of warfare into five different components in order to 
allow for a comparative evaluation on the basis of estimations. The five factors or 
components are: 
1) The Tao – influences peoples’ relationship to their leader, for instance 
their willingness to die for them (or not), not to fear danger; 
2) Heaven – includes the yin and yang, cold and heat. Constraints based 
upon the seasons of the year; 
3) Earth – refers to the nature of the distances and terrain, far or near, 
difficult or easy; 
78 
 
4) General – the possession of knowledge, discipline, credibility, 
benevolence and courage; 
5) Laws for military organisation and discipline – involves organisation 
and regulations, the Tao of command and the management of logistics (Sun Tzu, 
2003: 10-12).  
What is proposed by Sun Tzu is a mix of tangible and intangible elements 
that need to be not only known, but understood by the Commander in order to be 
successful on the battlefield. The tangible factors are Heaven, Earth and some 
elements of the Laws for military organisation and discipline. Intangible elements 
include the Tao, General and parts of the Laws for military organisation and 
discipline. These all touch on the issues of motivation, perception, persuasion and 
influence, which cannot be physically felt, yet still exert an effect upon the 
outcome of warfare. Not the least of which is the ability to motivate the military 
and the population to trust, follow and fight for the political and military 
leadership.  
 One of the key instruments of warfare, according to Sun Tzu, was the 
application of deception and disinformation. “Warfare is the Tao of deception.” 
Various deceptive ploys were suggested, such as to feign incapability, “when 
committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity”, creating an illusion as to the 
location of an objective and other ploys (Sun Tzu, 2003: 14-15). Thus the point of 
being able to deceive the enemy in order to gain advantage on the battlefield is 
recognised as being a critical asset in creating an advantage against the enemy. The 
key to this is the ability to fool the senses of the enemy so that they make a mistake 
or miscalculation based upon what they think they see or hear, rather than on what 
actually exists. This is therefore an ‘attack’ on the enemy’s decision-making 
process and capability, but does not exclude such methods being used upon a 
domestic civil population.  
 Niccolo Machiavelli was born in 1469, living in Florence during the 
Renaissance period, and is considered the father of modern political science. 
During 1519-20 he wrote the work The Art of War. He stressed that war must be 
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clearly defined, and developed the philosophy of ‘limited warfare’ that occurs 
when traditional diplomacy fails and war becomes an extension of politics (Sun 
Tzu also warned of the dangers of protracted warfare, which he said, no one 
profited from). A number of basic relationships between politics and war were 
enumerated by Machiavelli: 
1) Military power is the foundation of civil society; 
2) A well-ordered military establishment is an essential unifying element 
in civil society; 
3) A policy of military aggrandizement contributes to the stability and 
longevity of civil society;  
4) The military art and political art possess a common style;  
5) A military establishment tends to reflect the qualities of the civil 
society of which it is a part (Machiavelli, 1965: xlvii).  
According to Machiavelli, politics and the military possessed a number of 
similarities, and that a strong statesman must also be a capable general 
(Machiavelli, 1965: liii). He referred to politics and the military as being creative 
arts, “moulding raw human material into the desired form, as well as the necessary 
personal qualities for successful leadership (spirit, creative energy, personal 
resolve and will power … etc.) in difficult and trying environments (Machiavelli, 
1965: liv). This is in keeping with Sun Tzu’s fourth factor, which relates to the 
personal qualities of the general.  
 When it comes to the issue of deception, there is agreement with many 
that the use of deception and trickery against an enemy is completely justifiable. 
However, when it comes to fellow citizens and allies, Machiavelli does not 
characterise them as being a homogenous and loyal mass, but rather a collection of 
different interest that can either more or less coincide with the leadership’s. 
Therefore, he sees no moral dilemma in deceive or tricking fellow citizens and 
allies in order to create a sense of unity that permit the leadership to pursue its 
objectives (Machiavelli, 1965: lviii). This can certainly be observed in the 
contemporary context, such as the use of the pretext of the presence weapons of 
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mass destruction and links to terrorism as a means to initiate a seemingly 
legitimate war against Iraq, the deception went as far as the former Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, presenting the ‘irrefutable’ evidence before the United 
Nations.  
 Born in 1780 in Prussia and a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, 
although a soldier he was at times more characterised as a philosopher. Von 
Clausewitz was very concise in his characterisation of the nature and purpose of 
the pursuit of war. He defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will” (von Clausewitz, 1982: 101). The fulfilment of ‘our 
will’ therefore seems to be the spark that initiates the process that leads to war. 
What is the factor that decides what ‘our will’ is to be? This is tied to the influence 
and issues that are guided formed by politics. “Thus, therefore, the political object, 
as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim 
of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made” (von Clausewitz, 
1982: 109). This can be seen in various modern international military 
interventions, such as the low level of interest and commitment in such conflicts 
Rwanda and Darfur. And conversely the high level of interest and commitment in 
Iraq and currently Syria, where the objective is certainly a matter of imposing 
one’s political will and influence over the targeted country.  
 The use of war can be the avenue to either a means or an end, in 
answer to the political objective at hand. For instance, the 2003 invasion and 
occupation of Iraq was stated as being pursuant of the political end by the Bush 
administration. That is, to rid the United States of the supposed security threat of 
weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
However, it seems, with hindsight that the true purpose of the invasion and 
subsequent occupation of the country was a means of access to the rich natural 
resources, which necessitated the removal of the old regime and the installation of 
one that was compliant the Bush regime’s will.  
 An important point and distinction made by von Clausewitz is that 
“the conception that war is only part of political intercourse, therefore by no means 
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an independent thing in itself” (von Clausewitz, 1982: 402). This is especially 
relevant for Western countries in the day and age where the buzzwords and 
concepts revolve around such slogans as ‘the democratic control of armed forces’, 
which amounts to little more than establishing a political monopoly on the control 
and use of stated-based military force. There is little transparency or accountability 
by the political force to the public in terms of wielding military power. The 
obligations are from the military to the political.  
 There does not have to be an open and full use of military force in 
order to bring about violence that shall ultimately compel an opponent to yield to 
one’s political will. The United States and their policy of regime change through 
orchestrated revolutions have already proven this point. Additionally, the ‘limited’ 
war against Libya did not see a full deployment of military power against the 
Gadaffi regime. Decades of being the world’s sole remaining superpower seem to 
have caused a sense of over confidence that has seen the neglect of Sun Tzu’s 
warning regarding being involved in a protracted war, which it has been since 
September 2001 and has not got a clearly defined end to it.  
 
Information as a Threat and an Opportunity 
 
When one speaks of information security there is are a number of 
implications (See Buzan et al, 1998 for a detailed account of securitisation). 
Firstly, that information is potentially some kind of threat and therefore must be 
secured. Flowing on from this basic underlying assumption that something is a 
threat, then there is the other side of the equation, i.e. that there is something being 
threatened. Therefore two immediate questions need to be asked before proceeding 
any further, in order to get a clear understanding and perspective. How is 
information a threat? Another question that stems from this first question is to 
whom is information a threat?  
It should be noted that the institution that is responsible for defining and 
declaring a security threat is most often the state. By the state I am referring to the 
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work of a country’s parliament and/or president in terms of debate, declarations 
and laws passed. However, in determining what is to be judged a threat and what is 
not, is somewhat subjective and bound to the interests of the ruling power, rather 
than to the national interest or in the interest of the people. Although a perceived 
threat is often framed as being something that will harm the national interest or 
peoples’ interest, rather than as harming the interests of the incumbent political 
power as this is more easily ‘sold’ to the public.  
One can deduce that a security threat is something that can potentially 
weaken or threaten the continued existence of a political entity (for the emphasis in 
this work is on political rather than social or economic entities), and in particular a 
political entity that at the time holds power. Where does ‘information security’ fit 
into the process then? Its importance lies in the tenant that perception is more 
important than reality (Louw, 2001: 1-35). That is, people (the public) tend to react 
upon what they perceive as being reality rather than what may actually be the real 
case. Thus one’s communication potential, assuming that the requisite tangible 
(physical) and intangible (reputation etc.) assets are present, is geared toward 
information dominance. That is, in the market place of ideas, to crowd out 
potential competitors in order for one’s own message and vision to gain the upper 
hand and influence the target audience.  
Mass media help to shape people opinions and values through bringing what 
may often be events that are remote from a vast majority of a country’s population. 
As such, the mass media sphere is a hotly contested arena that transcends a number 
of planes – the political, the social, the educational and business. It is a mechanism 
that can unite these diverse sites and bring a common meaning. This becomes of 
even greater importance during times of political and economic instability.  
There can be said to be, in a general sense, an association between security 
and stability. What is meant by this is that with security comes stability. The 
stability being sought and desired can be measured in both economic and political 
terms. For an entity seeks to be in a stable environment, which it is best adapted to, 
in order to maximize its chances of survival as changes to the environment entail 
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adaptation. And when an entity is unable to adapt to a changing environment it can 
be substituted by another entity that is more suited and able to make the necessary 
modifications. Although at times it is necessary to embark on a course of change in 
order to survive. 
Whether it is to ensure a stable political environment or to embark upon a 
course of change, an incumbent political entity needs to be able master the 
situation and to guide it. This is more often than not requiring that entity to control 
symbolism and perception, in order to first give meaning and understanding to an 
event as it unfolds and then to guide (or at least predict) the reaction of the public 
to those events. The penalty for failing to master this difficult and unpredictable 
process is very well illustrated by the events of the Appeasement Process in the 
mid-1930s, when Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany 
in order to buy time. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain lost control of 
both the symbolism and the perception of the process, the result being not only the 
collapse of his reputation and political leadership, in spite of buying enough time 
for Britain to prepare against the coming German attack in the summer of 1940, he 
is an infamous figure in history. Therefore, to some extent, information cannot be 
regarded as being something that is strictly neutral in nature, but somewhat 
ideological instead.  
This situation can be contrasted to more modern contexts where a definite 
relationship between war and politics has been seen. In 1982 the Falklands War 
saved the government of Margaret Thatcher from electoral defeat, the euphoria and 
patriotism of the moment was harnessed for political gain. In a similar scenario, the 
9/11 attacks on the United States handed George W. Bush another term as 
President as the American people rallied around their leader. Conversely, the end 
of the First Chechen War (1994-96) was hastened by the incumbent Russian 
President, Boris Yelstin, owing to his extremely poor ratings in the polls and the 
coming Presidential election gave him no choice than to end the unpopular war in 
order to survive politically.  
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In connection with these different aspects, which have been described above, 
an overarching motivation for controlling the information sphere is that a belief 
exists that in doing so there is greater chance of regime survivability and that 
political, social and economic goals are more readily realizable. Attempts to 
control the content and flows in the information sphere are attempted through such 
means as strategic communication, communication management, public relations 
and so forth. These assumptions being derived from the view that by being able to 
determine the reality of an event by massaging public perception there is a greater 
possibility of being able to predict and determine events and reactions. Thereby 
this creates the idea that having greater control over shaping the process can be 
achieved through exercising a degree of information management.  
 
Targeting Tangible Versus Intangible Assets 
 
In a military environment, information operates at three different levels – 
tactical, operational and strategic. (Armistead, 2004) This mirrors the physical 
work of a military organisation in the physical world. Information and the ability to 
shape an audience’s perception of an event and the actors involved are seen as 
being a crucial task. The ability to handle this information and messaging 
effectively to assist the physical military operations needs to be carefully 
considered and executed. If it is not, but is poorly managed it has the potential to 
adversely affect operational aspects of a military campaign.  
This paper concerns the issue of warfare, and informational and intangible 
aspects that influence it, differences exist in the relationship and nature of 
interaction between information, politics and armed conflict, between the various 
kinds of armed conflict – regular warfare and irregular warfare. Regular warfare 
involves an armed conflict between various state based military forces on a defined 
line of military operations. Irregular warfare involves state based actors versus 
non-state actors, such as in terrorism or insurgency style warfare, where there is a 
lack of a clearly defined front line.  
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Terrorism as a weapon and tactic of choice is often selected by the weaker 
side owing to the asymmetric aspects of the conflict. That is, they are unable to 
compete owing to lacking the requisite material, manpower and finances to wage a 
short and successful war against their opponent. (Ganor, 2005) Therefore there is a 
necessity to find another factor to be in effect a form of equaliser in this imbalance. 
Information and the ability to message and influence an audience takes on a central 
role as a result. 
As stated above, terrorism is the weapon of the weaker opponent. Therefore 
the role of information and the contest to influence the minds and actions of a 
selected audience – waging an information campaign alongside a military 
campaign. This is not necessarily a contest to win over hearts and minds by the 
different sides, although this can also be a valid objective. Another central point is 
the issue of security, and above all human security. If the domestic civil population 
do not feel safe this may be translated into political demands, which may actually 
benefit the political agenda of the terrorists. Information and communication are 
used as the means to project certain images, opinions and beliefs, which can be 
used either as a deceptive ploy or to shape the environment of the battle space 
through influencing the information space.  
One of the aims of terrorists is to create a certain sense of fear in society. 
Fear exists when two sets of circumstances are simultaneously present in a society 
under terrorist threat. Firstly, that there must be a perception that something 
bad/negative has a high likelihood of happening (such as a bombing or hostage 
taking). Secondly, that there is a perception that the bad/negative event can happen 
to me (the individual). An important point to understand is that this is based upon 
the perception of the audience/public and not necessarily a reality. For all intents 
and purposes, perception is reality, and it is what people react to and based their 
decisions upon (Simons, 2010). The sense of uncertainty and risk can elevate the 




The methods used by terrorists can be explained through analysing the role 
of tangible and intangible assets, and how these two sets are related to each other 
in the greater strategic considerations of terrorism. Tangible assets are those 
physical objects that can be attacked by terrorists, such as buildings, people and 
vehicles. These are normally of symbolic or military value, and are intended to 
weaken physically or psychologically their opponent. They are physical objects 
that can be seen and touched.  
Intangible assets, on the other hand, are objects that cannot be touched 
physically, but they exert an impact upon the outcome of a battle or campaign. 
These assets are such things as reputation, brand, sense of security, legitimacy and 
resolve/will to fight. Although these aspects cannot be physically touched, they 
have a profound impact upon an opponent’s ability to wage or continue to wage an 
effective military campaign. These intangible assets are adversely affected through 
attacks upon the tangible assets, which points to the primary aim of attacking 
tangible assets is to diminish an opponent’s intangible assets.  
This degradation of an actor’s intangible assets shall only be effective 
though, if knowledge of the terrorist events is widespread and vivid. The most 
usual and effective means of transmitting news of terrorist acts is through the mass 
media, and more increasingly through social media and the internet. It links people 
to events that may otherwise be remote or unnoticed. Mass media has the ability to 
relay events, which are often descriptive rather than analytical in nature. An event 
is shown to happen, but not why. These events are newsworthy in themselves as 
they are dramatic and of interest.  
There is a side effect of this process though. Stories constructed in this 
manner can actually create a greater sense of risk and uncertainty, even if this is 
not the intention of the media outlets or journalists. By covering a story concerning 
a terrorist act there is a possibility of amplifying the operational capacity of a 
terrorist group. Because after the story it is not known whether the terrorist group 
that was responsible has the ability to launch another attack immediately or that 
they have exhausted their capacity for the time being. This then can be potentially 
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translated into political pressure through demands to assure or guarantee various 
intangible assets.  
 There is no guarantee that the terrorist group shall get precisely the 
coverage that they want from an act of terrorism. Simply, they do not have the 
ability to strictly control how the message is framed and covered in the mass 
media. However, by committing acts of terrorism there is the possibility to 
influence the hot topics covered in the mass media and thereby what is in the news 
(which may not be ordinarily covered).  
 Regular warfare differs in a number of different respects to irregular 
warfare. One of the chief differences is the involvement of state-based actors that 
oppose each other on a defined area, where front lines, exist and various belligerent 
forces are identifiable with their uniforms, symbols and weapons used. Although 
there may be inequality of access to mass media and communication assets, all 
parties are likely to have national and/or international media in order to 
communicate their values and narrative to domestic and foreign publics. Through 
the use of modern mass communication, a clear pattern leading up to a number of 
different wars is clearly observable, which dovetails with Sun Tzu’s notion of 
deception, although applied more liberally, according to that proposed by 
Machiavelli. A great deal of effort is made in establishing the narrative of the 
reluctance to go to war, and that this is done as a last resort only. The wars against 
Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Serbia (over Kosovo), and the worrying rhetoric and sabre 
rattling with Syria and Iran, demonstrate as posed by von Clausewitz the policy 
and heavily political nature of wars in the current context.  
 There is a distinct pattern of attempting to influence the perception, 
and therefore influence the relationship between the people to political leaders. As 
noted by Sun Tzu, a leader that is perceived in a positive light will accumulate a 
greater sense of legitimacy and following. This means that, unlike the irregular 
war, a clearly defined enemy is created in the political leader of the country, whilst 
simultaneously protecting their own image. This makes the use and conveyance of 
values and narratives very important. For instance, trying to shift the reputation of 
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historically and commonly understood enemies or injustices is applied to the 
contemporary named enemy (or ‘bad guy’). Thus nonsensical vocabularies and 
comparisons are made, for instance the use of the Soviet Union’s crushing of the 
1956 Hungarian Uprising to the 2008 Georgian-Russian War or the attempt to tar 
Saddam Hussein with the characteristics of Adolf Hitler. These are attempts at 
deception owing to their false basis. They are directed at civil publics than military 
ones, in order to influence consensus on the ‘righteous’ nature of the war in 
question.   
 When it comes to the issue of the definition of contemporary regular 
wars, a factor that is often absent is that of a clear definition of the conflict. 
Certainly there are slogans and branding applied to the various wars, political and 
armed conflicts. In terms of regular wars, these are increasingly being fought under 
an umbrella of ‘humanitarianism’, which is an oxymoron when applied to 
compelling one state to act according to another state’s will. Examples of branding 
are clearly evident as well, to make something that is contrived appear to be 
natural, in line with this trend, the Colour Revolutions of the first decade of the 
2000s have given away to the current Arab Spring.  
 However, in spite of this use of masking the true nature and identity of 
the wars and revolutions being initiated and fought, there are serious flaws in the 
current system. These wars are not defined, and certainly the political statesmen of 
today are not capable generals (a condition noted as being desirable by 
Machiavelli), whose tendency to interfere in military matters and yet not 
understanding them shall result in severe problems in the future. The nature of war 
can also transform with time and events, the March 2003 invasion of Iraq started as 
a regular war between the American-led coalition, but transformed quickly into an 
irregular conflict (involving elements of insurgency and terrorism) following the 
occupation of the country. There was seemingly little done in terms of defining this 
particular war, apart from the primary goal of removing the political regime of 
Saddam Hussein and installing a government that would be compliant to political 
and economic demands imposed upon it. The US seemed to be somewhat 
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unprepared for the insurgency that resulted from their heavy handed occupation of 




Although the manner of weaponry that is used to wage war has evolved into 
every more increasingly destructive technology, there are other factors and 
elements that have remained constant over time. The tangible factors and means of 
fighting have evolved with the economic and technological changes that have 
occurred in society. The Heaven and Earth elements described by Sun Tzu still 
have an impact upon military operations, but to a lesser extent as technological 
innovation has been minimising this issue with some success.  
 Many intangible elements and factors have proved to be resilient in 
their continued importance in creating and fighting wars. The continued relevance 
of politics, which imposes an increasing level of influence on war, where wars are 
used as an instrument of policy whereby another country is forced to submit to the 
political will of the aggressor. This has been a constant through the centuries. 
However, some elements have been ignored, such as becoming embroiled in a 
lengthy and poorly defined war.  
 The intangible elements of legitimacy, reputation, public will and 
opinion are all critical factors when shaping the information environment to 
support launching or continuing a military conflict. Both Machiavelli and von 
Clausewitz noted the centrality of politics to war, which still remains. War and 
politics have become perhaps even more inseparable in the contemporary context, 
politics determines where and when armed force is used, and to what extent it is 
deployed against the opponent. As noted by Machiavelli, there are a number of 
similarities between the military and political spheres, such as the need to 
understand and shape the tangible and intangible environment around them.  
 As such, there is a need to shape and influence the opinions and 
perception of various publics when preparing to wage a war. The situation creates 
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the situation where an information war runs before and then parallel to the physical 
fighting in regular warfare. In irregular warfare the information war runs parallel to 
the fighting. The narratives, vocabulary, values, frames and images need to be 
carefully nurtured and controlled in order to cultivate the desired effects upon the 
target publics. Intangible assets before or during a war can be both an opportunity 
and a threat to political regimes, depending on the prevailing conditions in the 
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